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Abstract 
Although most organizations have risk critical information available, it is not always integrated. 
In this paper, a bowtie perspective is proposed that enables an integration of three risk data sources. 
Issues with these three risk data sources are discussed and ideas for improvement are proposed. 
The integration of bowtie risk assessments, incident analyses and audit data complements each 
other and provides an interesting perspective on the status of the process safety management 
system. The integrated approach can be a useful addition to existing process safety management 
approaches. 
 
1.  Introduction 
Process safety incident still occur, amongst others illustrated by the current investigations of the 
US CSB. In 2005, a major process safety incident occurred in the United Kingdom. A vapor cloud 
explosion and fires shook the Buncefield oil depot, it was the largest peacetime UK fire (UK HSE, 
2011). Although 43 people were injured by the incident, there were no fatalities. The total 
economic impact of the incident was estimated to be 1 billion pounds (UK HSE, 2008). St Albans 
Crown Court fined the companies involved with the Buncefield incident millions of pounds 
(Macalister & Wearden, 2010). Below is a part of the statement which was issued by Gordon 
MacDonald of the UK Health & Safety Executive in response to the Court decision (ODN, 2010): 
  
“Lessons must be learned from this incident. From the board room down, companies must ask 
themselves these questions. Do we understand what can go wrong? Do we know what our systems 
are to prevent this happening? Do we have information to assure us they are working effectively?” 
 
We will have a look at these 3 questions from a process safety management perspective. “Do we 
understand what can go wrong?” Companies generally understand what can go wrong in terms of 
process safety. For instance by identifying hazards and associated scenarios with HAZID or 
HAZOP. “Do we know what our systems are to prevent this happening?”Again companies know 
what systems are in place to prevent the identified process safety incidents from developing. For 
example, through the identification of safety barriers in a risk assessment for high-risk scenarios. 
Do we have information to assure us they are working effectively?”Yet again, companies often 
 
have information about whether these systems aimed to prevent unwanted process safety incidents 
are working effectively. For instance, companies obtain incident and audit data. 
 
The problem is not that companies have insufficient information to answer these questions. 
Although the information might be available in the organization, it is not always integrated. In this 
article, it is argued what the issues are when these different forms of information are stored in 
individual silo’s (i.e. incident data in one silo, audit data in another silo etc.) and ideas for 
improvement are proposed. 
Companies involved in high-risk processes can use a variety of methods to analyze and assess risk. 
These methods usually complement each other well. For example, a semi-quantitative LOPA will 
provide a different perspective to risk in comparison to a qualitative bowtie risk assessment. The 
bowtie method is an increasingly popular method to analyze and assess risk   (de Ruijter & 
Guldenmund, 2016). In a bowtie risk assessment, potential incident scenarios and associated 
barriers are identified (Figure 1). Sklet (2006) defines safety barriers as “Safety barriers are 
physical and/or non-physical means planned to prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or 
accidents”  
 
In the proposed approach, the bowtie diagram is used as a framework to integrate incident and 
audit data. Integrating risk assessments, incident- and audit data yields valuable insights on the 
functioning of safety barriers for high-risk processes. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Basic bowtie diagram 
2.  Integrating incident data & bowties 
First, a perspective is provided on the issue with incident data in high-risk processes and ideas for 
improvement are proposed. In the next section audit data is discussed.  
 
2.1.Incident data in individual silos 
Although process safety incidents for high-risk processes in organizations are analyzed, it is not 
uncommon that these incidents remain in individual silos (Figure 2). An incident is analyzed, but 
the link or correlations between these incidents remain unclear with the individual silos approach. 
Recommendations from incidents are applied at a local level and the lessons learned are not 
utilized in similar and other situations (Drupsteen et al., 2013).  
 
 
Figure 2 - Incidents in individual silos 
2.2. Creating a common denominator between incident and bowties with barriers 
A common denominator and framework is needed to create a link between incidents and add 
context to the data by linking them to bowties. In this paper it is proposed that the barrier concept 
should play this role as common denominator between risk assessment and incident analysis. The 
barrier is used in both bowtie analysis and in various barrier-based incident analysis models. 
 
A barrier-based incident analysis method creates the opportunity to integrate incident data and 
bowties. In this paper, the incident analysis method Barrier Failure Analysis (BFA) will be used. 
BFA diagrams are comprised of events, barriers and causation paths (Figure 3). Bowtie and BFA 




Figure 3 - Barrier Failure Analysis incident analysis method 
2.3.Trending incident data onto bowties 
Bowties can provide input for incident analysis, since bowties can be perceived as a collection of 
potential process safety incident scenarios. As shown in Figure 4, when an incident occurs, it is 
often the case that one of the incident pathways in the bowtie has become a reality. This pathway 
is highlighted in red (corrosion leading to loss of containment, leading to land contamination due 




Figure 4 - Feedback loop between incident- and bowtie diagrams 
During the BFA incident analysis, the scenario line which was extracted from the bowtie risk 
assessment is extended with additional information, such as the root causes which resulted in the 
failure of the barrier (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5 - Templated BFA incident analysis with input from bowtie 
Because the scenario was initially extracted from the bowtie diagram, the barrier failure 
information which was added during the incident analysis can be easily fed back to various 
elements of the bowtie; top events, threats, consequences and barriers (Figure 6). Trending this 
incident data onto a bowtie diagram provides valuable information over longer periods of time. 
For example, which process safety incident scenarios occur more frequent and which barriers are 
(often) implicated in a negative manner. In this way targeted process safety improvement plans 
can be created by integrating incident data onto the bowtie diagram. Moreover, the link with the 
incident data, such as root causes and incident recommendations, and bowtie risk assessments 
remains intact. 
 
Additionally, using the bowtie as input for incident analysis can be a trigger to create and update 





Figure 6 - Trending of incident data on a bowtie diagram 
 
2.4. Incident recommendations 
The incident section started by noting that lessons learned from incidents are not used in similar 
and other situations (Drupsteen et al., 2013). Recommendations focus on root causes after an 
incident analysis with RCA (Rooney & Vanden Heuvel, 2004). Root causes and associated 
recommendations can become standalone entities in this way. Root cause recommendations are 
often long term fixes which are challenging to attain and maintain.  
 
Recommendations in BFA can be made on root cause- and barrier level. Recommendations on a 
barrier level, depending on the scope and context of the BFA, tend to be more operational. This 
makes it easier and more realistic to remedy an issue with recommendations on a barrier level in a 
shorter term. The barrier provides a concrete point to apply lessons learned as well, from either 
root cause or barrier level, to similar and other occurrences. This is because barrier X might be 
implicated in bowtie scenario 1, but this barrier could also be present in bowtie scenario 2.  
 
Through the common framework, the correspondence of incident data (e.g. root causes and 
recommendations) and bowtie risk assessments remains intact. This provides an opportunity to 
apply lessons learned to similar and other situations. 
 
3.  Integrating audit data & bowties 
In this section, a perspective is provided at the issue with audit data for high-risk processes and 
ideas for improvement are proposed.  
 
3.1. Process safety management compliance audits 
The process safety management system is depicted in the different silos in order to explain the 




Figure 7 – Depiction of process safety management system standard components in silos 
Organizations involved process safety management of hazardous chemicals are required to apply 
process safety management standards such as the US Occupational Safety & Health 
Administration (OSHA) 1910.119 standard (1992). One of the components of the US OSHA 
process safety management standard is compliance audits: “Employers shall certify that they have 
evaluated compliance with the provisions of this section at least every three years to verify that 
the procedures and practices developed under the standard are adequate and are being followed.” 
 
The compliance audit results of a process safety management will show compliance for the 
different sections of a standard. This gives a good indication of what sections of the standard 
requires resources. However, the results remain in individual silos, and correspondence between 
these process safety compliance audit results remains unclear (Figure 8). 
  
 
Figure 8 - Process safety management compliance audits 
3.2. Risk-based audits 
Zemering & Swuste (2005) applied the concept of risk-based auditing to bowties. A risk-based 
audit takes audit questions on a barrier level regarding the relevant process safety management 
system. Since barriers are hardly ever comprised of one silo, most questions will related to barriers 




Figure 9 - Taking a slice throughout the process safety management system with a risk-based 
audit 
An example will be used to explain the concept of risk-based audits. The barrier ‘Emergency 
shutdown’ is taken as an example. Audit questions can be asked to get an indication of the health 
of the emergency shutdown barrier. These audit questions can be relevant to the different parts of 
the process safety management system. 
 
For example, a question regarding emergency planning and response could be: “Is an emergency 
action plan implemented?” A question regarding training could be: “Is personnel trained in 
emergency shutdown?” And a question regarding operating procedures could be: “Are the 
operating procedures for emergency shutdown well communicated to personnel?” 
 
 
Figure 10 - Risk-based process safety management system audit questions (left) and the 
visualized audit results (right) 
The previous example mentioned 1 barrier and gave 3 example audit questions on different process 
safety management system components. Applying this risk-based auditing on a larger scale can 





Figure 11 - Risk-based audit on a bowtie 
In case of a compliance audit, a small amount negative audit results for a particular process safety 
management sections might get lost in overall audit results. Whilst these negative audit results on 
the different process safety management sections might coincidentally affect the same barrier and 
provide a critical signal of a barrier that is undermined in its effective functioning, an example of 
this is given in Figure 12. Although the overall percentages of compliance may seem relatively 
high, the bits that were non-conformant may actually affect the same barrier. If this is the case, 
then this may indicate a significant problem with a barrier and therefore the organization’s 
exposure to risk. 
 
 
Figure 12 - Depiction of audit result of process safety management system components 
4. The interaction between incident & risk-based audits data sources  
Integrating incident and audit data have been discussed separately, but they complement each other 
in an interesting way. An organization does not always have a lot of incident data for a high-risk 
scenario. This is due to two reasons. The first reason is that for some scenarios there might not be 
a lot of incident data because the barriers are seldom challenged in incidents. The second reason 
is that in regards to near misses, the right side of the bowtie can be a blind spot. Although process 
safety incidents still occur, organizations individually do not face certain high-risk incidents too 
frequent. Since the right hand side of the bowtie is often dedicated to regaining control over a loss 
 
of control situation or mitigating the negative impact of unwanted consequence. An organization 
can obtain a proactive indication of the health of barriers using audit data if incident data is lacking.  
 
Integrating incident as well as audit data on bowties strengthens the proposed approach. The 
absence of incident data is not necessarily a sign for solid process safety control. Incidents might 
not have happened, although the barriers might be in a bad shape. The dynamic component of the 
Swiss Cheese metaphor (Reason, 1997) provides insight why.  
 
5. Discussion 
The approach and proposed ideas have several notes for discussion. 
 
Although this approach is presented as an addition to current process safety management 
techniques such as the compliance audit or RCA, it might cause the organization to introduce a 
new ways of analyzing and assessing risk. In this case: the bowtie method, BFA and risk-based 
audits. To use the integrated approach requires that bowties have to be created for particular 
process safety incident scenarios. This can subsequently become the framework for the integration 
audit and incident data. Next to bowties, risk-based audits need to be developed for the bowtie risk 
assessments. The creation and maintenance of bowties, BFA’s and risk-based audits will require 
an investment of resources. 
 
A challenge for this approach is that there is often not a lot of incident data for the organization’s 
process safety incident scenarios. Especially the major accident scenarios are difficult to link back 
to a bowtie since they (hopefully) don’t occur frequent in an organization. Even when a major 
accident scenario has not occurred, its potential can be expressed in a BFA and providing valuable 
input if barriers were challenged during the incident.  
 
Process safety incidents might be more complex than a bowtie diagram. This could be a trigger to 
update the bowtie diagram. 
 
Near misses often neglect the right side of the bowtie. This is dependent though on the scope of 
the bowtie though, especially the formulation and placement of the top event in terms of point in 
time. However, the right side of the bowtie is usually aimed at recovering from a loss of control 
moment or reducing the negative impact of undesired consequence. This bolsters the call of 
integrating audit data on a bowtie as well, to add context where incident data is lacking. 
 
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that this could be a useful addition to managing process 
safety. This can be underlined with an example compliance audit result. In the figure below, 
training shows 35% compliance. From a compliance audit point of view, it is clear that these are 
not great audit results for the domain of training. In the bowtie diagram, these negative audit results 
might be dispersed across the bowtie and not be easily observed. This is illustrated in Figure 13. 
This stresses an important message of this paper. This approach is not aimed to stop organization 
with process safety compliance audits (or with RCA for that matter). This approach is not a 




Figure 13 - Different dispersions of negative audit result of a process safety management system 
component 
6. Conclusion 
The individual silos issue of risk data (risk assessments, incident- and audit data) in regard to 
process safety is discussed and ideas for improvement are proposed. These three different data 
sources complement each other and provide an interesting perspective on the status of the process 
safety management system. It can be a useful addition to existing process safety management 
approaches by providing context and different insights into the functioning of the process safety 
management system. 
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